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The Public Trust and the Chicago Lakefront
Review of Kearney & Merrill’s Lakefront: Public Trust and Private Rights in
Chicago (Cornell U. Press, 2021)
Michael C. Blumm*
Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill’s brilliantly illustrated Lakefront1 is sure to win
American legal history awards for its riveting history of the machinations behind the preservation
of the magnificent Chicago lakefront, now dominated by public spaces. The authors weave
together a compelling account of how the law affected the development of the post-fire Chicago
in the late 19th and 20th centuries—largely made by lawyers and courts and only ratified by
legislatures. The book’s title suggests that the story is largely about the public trust doctrine (PTD).
But the doctrine is hardly the centerpiece of the authors’ story. What they have to say about the
doctrine is confined to the Illinois version of the PTD, and they do not endeavor to explain where
it deviates from the modern direction of the PTD.2
The book’s history of Chicago and its lakefront is groundbreaking legal history, buttressed
by twenty years of exhaustive research, colorful characters, and interesting legal developments, of
which the PTD played only a supporting role until the 1970s. The principal lesson of their story,

*Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. Matthew Hebert ’23
provided considerable help with the footnotes.
1
JOSEPH D. KEARNEY & THOMAS W. MERRILL, LAKEFRONT: PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CHICAGO (2021) (replete with numerous photos and figures and two useful indices). The book builds on
earlier articles by the authors: The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened
in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHIC. L. REV. 799 (2004); and Private Rights in Public Lands: The Chicago
Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. L. REV. 1417 (2015). The
authors provide a series of blog posts explaining the book at the Volokh Conspiracy, which celebrates free
markets, see Eugene Volokh, Dean Joseph Kearney & Prof. Thomas Merrill Guest-Blogging About
"Lakefront: Public Trust and Private Rights in Chicago," https://reason.com/volokh/2021/06/14/deanjoseph-kearney-prof-thomas-merrill-guest-blogging-about-lakefront-public-trust-and-private-rights-inchicago/.
2
See, e.g., MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTIANA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (3rd ed. 2021).
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one the authors do not emphasize enough, is a persistent struggle between public and private rights
along the lakefront. What is unusual is how long this struggle endured, beginning with Illinois
Central Railroad’s dominance in the late 19th century and the so-called “Lake Front Steal” of
1869,3 in which the Illinois legislature conveyed roughly 1000 acres of submerged Lake Michigan
land to the railroad. The legislature soon thought better of the giveaway, and its rescission in 1873
culminated in a famous 1892 Supreme Court decision on the PTD, Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois,4 pronounced as the lodestar case of the doctrine by Professor Joe Sax a half-century ago.5
The authors discuss the controversy over the lakebed conveyance and the Court’s
pathbreaking decision, but they view the effect of the PTD on the Chicago lakefront as less
significant than other considerations like the public dedication doctrine, which nearby landowners
invoked to restrict development of the lakefront and preserve their views of the lake. 6 Still, the
Illinois Central Court focused public attention on what was an attempt to create a monopoly of the
lake’s outer harbor, and that attention has persisted for a century-and-a-quarter following the
Court’s decision. Today, the Chicago lakefront is largely public, the consequence of several factors
that Lakefront explains. This struggle between public and private rights over the Chicago lakefront
existed long before the dawn of the modern environmental movement a half-century ago,
influenced not only by the Court’s surprising 1892 decision but also by the persistent oversight of

The authors’ chapter 1 is entitled “The Lake Front Steal.” LAKEFRONT, at 8.
Illinois v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 146 U.S. 387 (1892), discussed in LAKEFRONT, passim.
5
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970); see also Michael C. Blumm & Zachery A. Schwartz, The Public Trust
Doctrine Fifty Years After Sax and Some Thoughts on Its Future, 44 PUBLIC LAND & RES. L. REV. 1 (2021)
(tracing Sax’s considerable influence). Without an attempt to deconstruct the Sax article, the book claims
that it was about providing fora in which the public interest against public resources giveaways could be
expressed, and those fora were supplied by federal legislation like the Clean Water and National
Environmental Policy Acts. LAKEFRONT, at 275. Overlooked is the Lakefront Case’s proscription against
“substantial impairment” of trust resources, a substantive requirement beyond supplying procedural fora.
See infra text accompanying note 73.
6
LAKEFRONT, pp. 87-127 (discussing the public dedication doctrine).
3
4
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neighboring landowners protecting their views of the lake. This public-private clash, in which
private rights were subject to both public and neighboring landowner challenges, created the
glorious Chicago waterfront of today.
This review of the Kearney and Merrill book focuses on the public trust doctrine, as
articulated in the Lake Front Case that culminated in the Illinois Central Court’s decision. There
is more to the book, mostly centering on local Chicago interest, so this review concentrates on the
public trust. Though in the book’s title, the authors maintain that the PTD was not as central to the
story of the lakefront’s preservation as other influences.7 They remain public trust skeptics.
I. The Controversial Conveyance
The Lakefront Case involving Illinois Central Railroad might be the PTD’s lodestar, but it
came a half-century after the U.S. Supreme Court ratified the PTD in a case involving oyster
harvesting in New Jersey’s Raritan River. 8 The authors do not attempt to explain this history,
confining the earlier cases to footnotes. 9 Nor do they examine in any detail the remarkable
expansion of public rights that took place in the late 19th century from tidal waters (the so-called
English rule) to include navigable-in-fact waters, reflecting the advent of steam power on the
country’s great inland waterways, like the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers (the so-called American

7

LAKEFRONT, at 306.
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), upholding the reasoning of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in an earlier oyster harvesting case in the Raritan River, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
See BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND ECOLOGY IN NEW
JERSEY HISTORY (2nd ed. 1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision, which the U.S. Supreme Court
considered to be persuasive in Martin, 41 U.S. at 417-18 (1842), relied heavily on Sir Matthew Hale’s
treatise, De Jure Maris (first published in 1787 but written over a hundred years before), which traced the
English origin of public rights in navigable waters to the Magna Carta. On Hale’s influence, unmentioned
in Lakefront, see Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary and Sovereign Public Trust
Obligations: From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey and Oswego Lake, 43 VT. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2018).
9
LAKEFRONT, at 319-20, n. 94. The authors do cite a recent article exploring the Roman history of the PTD
by J.B. Ruhl & Thomas McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was It, and Does It Support an
Atmospheric Trust, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2020). Id. But they make no attempt to explain the Lake Front
Case in light of the expanding scope of public rights that 19th century American courts had recognized,
infra note 10, before the Lake Front Case.
8
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rule).10 The Supreme Court had approved this expansion in the scope of public rights to include
navigable-in-fact waters years before its decision in the Lake Front Case.11
With no explanation of the 19th century’s rapidly expanding law of public rights in
waterbodies, the book’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision makes Justice Field’s decision
appear to be more idiosyncratic than it was. The book inaccurately claims that the Court “adopted”
the PTD in the decision upholding the Illinois legislature’s revocation of the railroad grant. 12
Actually, the Court had adopted the public rights underlying doctrine a half-century before,
although without naming it as “the public trust doctrine”.13 What the Court did in its 1892 decision
was to expand the doctrine from a public ownership principle, protecting public access to
waterbodies for navigation and fishing, to a nonalienation rule restricting public conveyances to
private parties like the Illinois Central Railroad.
The book’s discussion of the long-running controversy over the Chicago Harbor is detailed,
illuminating, and will forever affect the interpretation of the events that preserved the Chicago
Harbor mostly for public uses. The authors explain Illinois Central’s domination of the waterfront
beginning with an 1852 city ordinance enacted over the objections of Michigan Avenue property
owners, whose opposition to lakefront development would prove steadfast and become an essential
component of the public lakefront that still exists 170 years later.14
10

The authors claim that in cases before its Illinois Central RR decision, Illinois courts had decided that the
state had adopted the so-called “English rule” of public ownership of the beds of navigable waters, which
confined public rights to tidal waters. See LAKEFRONT, at 16. But in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (2 Wall.)
389 (1877), fifteen years before its Lake Front decision, the Court invoked admiralty jurisdiction to uphold
public rights in inland, nontidal waters. LAKEFRONT, at 74. The book does not mention The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), which overruled The Steam-Boat Thomas
Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), and announced that federal admiralty jurisdiction was not
limited to tidal waters. See Blumm & Engel, supra note 8, at 12-13.
11
See cases cited supra note 10.
12
LAKEFRONT, at 31.
13
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14
LAKEFRONT, at 12 (noting that the 1852 ordinance was enacted over a mayoral veto). Also in 1852, a
prominent landowner, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, granted the railroad a right-of-way over riparian land
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The railroad’s wish to expand in the post-Civil War era confronted the uncertainty over the
ownership of the Lake Michigan lakebed. According to the authors, confusion over whether the
lakebed was owned by the state, the federal government, or upland riparian landowners hindered
the railroad’s expansion plans.15 Between the 1869 legislation and the Supreme Court’s 1892
decision, the ownership question would be resolved in favor of state ownership before the Lake
Front Case was even filed.16
Local opposition to the railroad’s development of the shoreland led it to seek approval from
the state legislature. The ensuing lobbying—which the authors acknowledge included a fair
amount of corruption and several close votes in the Illinois Senate 17—led to the enactment of the
1869 statute, which passed over the governor’s veto and conveyed roughly 1000 acres of Lake
Michigan lakebed to the railroad, and was labeled by opponents as “the Lakefront Steal.”18 The
he owned in south Chicago, reserving “all right, title, and ownership to the land and water” to “the Center
of Lake Michigan. Id. at 308-09, n. 21. According to one account, Douglas got rich off sales to the railroad
he championed in Congress, suggesting that he acted out of self-interest:
There was no northern Illinois to speak of. Chicago virtually did not exist until the 1850s, when it
boomed because of the Illinois Central Railroad, which was created by Stephen A. Douglas through
an act of Congress. He became very wealthy as a result because he owned all the right-of-way real
estate along Lake Michigan in Chicago that he sold to the Illinois Central.
Scott Horton, Lincoln’s Party, Harpers (Aug. 5, 2016), http://harpers.org/2016/08/lincoln’-party/ (quoting
a Lincoln biographer, Sidney Blumenthal, in A SELF-MADE MAN (2016)).
15
LAKEFRONT, at 20-23 (explaining the controversy over the proposed sale of north Lake Park in 1867 to
the railroad to site a passenger depot. The opponents claimed the parkland was or should be inalienable, as
the lakefront “ought to be held forever sacred as the property in trust for the enjoyment and use of all
conditions and classes of people of poor, as well as rich, among our people”). See infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
16
See the cases discussed in supra note 8.
17
The authors conclude that vote-buying in the Illinois legislature was commonplace, and that the evidence
“clearly leans” in favor of Illinois Central’s using “corrupt means” to secure passage of the Lakefront Act.
LAKEFRONT, at 34-36. See also id. at 29 (on the close Senate votes).
18
Chapter 1 of book is entitled “The Lakefront Steal,” a label which the authors largely reject; see also
figure 1.7 = notice of a “Great Mass Meeting” at Farwell Hall on Feb. 17, 1869 concerning the “The Great
Swindle.” The authors suggest that the railroad primarily exercised its “corrupt means” in order to protect
its existing investments in lakefront properties, not to secure future profits from control over the outer
harbor; therefore, Justice Field’s later characterization of it as “grasping plutocratic corporation” was
inaccurate because “fear is a more powerful motive than greed . . .” LAKEFRONT, at 32. They also argue
that the 1869 grant did not give the railroad monopoly control over Chicago harbor, as it did not displace
existing harbor facilities in the Chicago River, and they maintain that the widespread assumption about the
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governor’s veto might have been influenced by a couple of prescient newspaper articles
adumbrating the nonalienation rule that the Supreme Court would eventually adopt a quartercentury later.19
The enactment of the Lake Front Act hardly ended the dispute over the lakefront. Litigation
ensued, first instigated by Cyrus McCormick, the inventor of the mechanical reaper and founder
of International Harvester, who was a Michigan Avenue resident. McCormick was soon joined by
the U.S. Attorney, who claimed, without much foundation, that the railroad could not construct a
new depot in north Lake Park because the federal government either owned the land or was a
trustee of an 1852 dedication that the land be forever free of buildings, apparently due to the city’s
ordinance permitting operation of the railroad. 20
The case was heard by District Judge Thomas Drummond. He enjoined the railroad from
constructing a passenger depot in August 1869, ruling that the parkland was subject to a common

limited role of government at the time meant that “perhaps most of those voting for the Lake Front Act
perceived it to be in the public interest.” Id. at 33. There is also the matter of the fact that one provision of
the Lake Front Act promised a 7% gross receipts tax on developments from expanded railroad operators,
providing revenue to fund downstate development projects that attracted downstate votes, whose support
prevailed over the local opposition. Id. at 33-34 (characterizing the vote on the statute as “a fight between
Chicago and downstate interests . . . won by the latter”).
19
See LAKEFRONT, at 29 (recounting articles in the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Republican that
argued for state ownership of the Lake Michigan lakebed and water and maintained that the alienation of
either would be inconsistent with state sovereignty). On the governor’s veto, see id. at 30.
20
See id. at 36-37. This dedication was a condition of the city’s grant of permission to the railroad to operate
within the city limits. In 1850, the federal government granted about 2.5 million acres to the state for a
railroad running from the southern tip of the state to Chicago and beyond (the authors provide a useful map
in figure 1.2). A year later, the state-chartered Illinois Central Railroad and reconveyed the federal land
grant to the railroad, but conditioned its operation within municipalities on local consent. Id. at 10. In 1852,
Chicago gave permission to the railroad—over a mayoral veto, prompted by the opposition of Michigan
Avenue residents. Id. at 12. That ordinance purported to give the railroad the right to fill the lake for its
operations, which the authors suggest was of uncertain legal validity. Id. at 12. The ordinance also included
a railroad promise to build a breakwater to protect the city and its residents from flooding, and importantly
a promise to the Michigan Avenue residents that no buildings and improvements east of Lake Park would
block their views of the lake. Id. at 12-13.
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law dedication, enforceable by the federal government.21 The railroad chose not to appeal
Drummond’s decision and, as a result, never built the depot.22 The authors suggest that this blocked
shoreland development caused the railroad to shift attention to developing the lakebed that it
secured in the 1869 Lake Front Act. 23 Lakebed development would require the railroad to defend
the validity of the 1869 conveyance, which was under question by the Illinois legislature, which
introduced an 1871 bill to repeal the 1869 Act.
The same year, the U.S. Attorney filed another suit, this time challenging the railroad’s
proposed filling of the outer harbor as interfering with navigation without federal consent. 24 An
ensuing settlement would establish that the federal government could set harbor lines protecting
public navigation, which the authors maintain effectively curtailed the original grant of roughly
one-thousand acres to just a “modest curtilage around the railroad’s existing improvements.” 25 A
persistent theme throughout the book is an effort to reduce the stakes involved in the Supreme
Court’s affirmance of the state’s legislative revocation of the Lake Front Act.26 Much ado about
relatively little seems to be the idea.
II. The Context
Intervening was the Great Chicago Fire in October 1871. It decimated most of the
downtown area, nearly one-third of the city’s residences, including the Illinois Central Railroad
21

Id. at 37 (noting that Judge Drummond held that the dedication was based on common law, not a statutory
dedication under Illinois law).
22
Id.
23
Id. p. 38.
24
Id. at 39. The federal government would settle this case in 1872, with the railroad consenting to the federal
government establishing harbor lines beyond which the railroad could not obstruct navigation, which,
according to the authors, “severely restrict[ed] its ability to engage in further construction of without the
consent of the federal government.” Id.
25
Id. at 44.
26
For example, discussing a so-called “dock-line settlement” with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in
which the railroad agreed to abide by the Corps’ harbor lines to protect navigation, the authors conclude
that the settlement “greatly reduced the scope of the rights conferred by the Lake Front Act . . . ” to the
effect that the “Lake Front Act was now but a shadow of what it had seemed in 1869. Id. at 44.
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passenger depot.27 In the wake of the fire, the city decided to dump the resulting debris and fill in
the lake between Lake Park and the breakwater that Illinois Central built under the 1869 Act. 28
The fills would begin the transformation of the lakefront.
The Illinois legislature proceeded to revoke the 1869 grant in 1873, in the wake of the fire
and amid an economic depression, for which the legislators were looking for scapegoats. The
authors suggest that the motive for the repeal was to punish the railroad for its “presumed veniality”
in getting the 1869 legislation passed. 29 The railroad defended on the ground that it possessed
“vested rights” under the 1869 Act.30 But a populist, anti-railroad sentiment—newspapers alleged
that the Senate vote on the repeal depended upon how many of its lawyers were paid by the
railroads—overcame that argument. 31 The authors consider the repeal to be “largely symbolic
legislation, a rebuke of railroads. . . .”32 Perhaps it was also a reflection of the growing political
power of the Granger movement. 33
The railroad challenged the 1873 repeal, but not immediately because it was preoccupied
with rebuilding after the fire and with combatting the effects of an economic depression that began
in 1873 and persisted until the end of the 1870s.34 Then, in 1880, the railroad began “an aggressive

27

Id.
Id. p. 41. The authors observe that “[i]t did not occur to anyone to ask the state’s permission.” Id.
29
Id. at 45.
30
Id. at 45–46.
31
Id. at 46-47 (explaining that the House vote on the repeal was 127-5, but the Senate vote was closer, 3111, and that the railroad likely made cash payments to legislators).
32
LAKEFRONT, at 48 (noting that the public resented railroads for charging high rates “and [their] generally
high-handed behavior,” and observing that the repeal legislation did nothing to produce the public goods
the Lakefront Act promised: an outer harbor, a new depot, and more parkland).
33
The populist Granger movement scored a big win in the Supreme Court in 1877, when the Court upheld
the ability of state railroad commissions to regulate railroad rates and service, a revolutionary development
in public rights. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent
Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1971).
34
LAKEFRONT, at 48–49 (noting that the 1869 judicial injunction against development in north Lake Park
caused the railroad to build its passenger depot outside of the park).
28
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expansion campaign” that included constructing large wharves north of Lake Park to facilitate
unloading timber from the booming lumber industry in Wisconsin and Michigan, a kind of “less
grandiose” outer harbor than envisioned in the 1869 Act.35 But in 1881, when the railroad began
filling 100 feet of the lakebed to expand its tracks in Lake Park, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
objected, and eventually the Secretary of War, Robert Todd Lincoln, the assassinated president’s
son, rejected the filling in 1882.36 The result focused the railroad’s attention on developing its outer
harbor rights under the repealed Lake Front Act. But in 1883, its efforts were challenged by the
state in what would become the Lake Front Case.
The state filed suit against the railroad, the city, and the federal government, claiming that
it owned the submerged land of Lake Michigan, and that the Illinois’ legislature’s repeal of the
1869 grant was effective.37 The city claimed that as the riparian owner of Lake Park, it controlled
development in the harbor. 38 The railroad, which removed the case to federal court, maintained
that the 1869 Act validly transferred to it vested rights that the state could not repeal and that the
railroad now owned the lakebed and controlled the harbor.39 Thus began what was then called the
“greatest case ever tried in Illinois.” 40
III. The Case

35

Id. at 50. These wharves, or piers, extended 800 feet beyond the dock-line, but were approved by both
the Corps of Engineers and the city. The state was not consulted. Id. at 51.
36
Id. at 52 (explaining that the railroad’s right-of-way, granted in 1852 by the city, supra note 20, was for
a width of 300-feet, but it had only used 200 feet). Secretary Lincoln rejected a board of inquiry’s
recommendation that the Corps approve the landfilling and extend it to include more piers because he
thought it would exceed the government’s authority and assumed that the railroad owned the lakebed, a
matter in dispute. Id. at 53.
37
Id. at 54.
38
Id. at 55, arguing for the so-called “English rule” of submerged land ownership, which was about to be
resoundingly rejected by the Supreme Court. See supra note 10.
39
Id. at 54-55. The authors explain that the removal to federal court almost certainly would not be granted
today. Id. p. 316, n. 37.
40
Id. at 54 (so-labeled by the authors).
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The Lake Front Case, like just about everything else involving the Chicago waterfront, was
not straightforward. The federal government initially refused to appear, even though urged to do
so by adjacent Michigan and Prairie Avenue landowners—by the time the federal government
acceded, four years had gone by, and it was too late for federal attorneys to participate in the trial
and oral argument.41 The trial began in 1887, presided over by Justice John Marshall Harlan, riding
circuit, along with Judge Henry Blodgett, although the evidence was taken for nearly two months
by a master in chancery court.42 Illinois Central emphasized the significant improvements it had
made in reliance on its Lake Front Act grant and the severe congestion in the harbor due to
increasing traffic.43 Oral argument consumed eight days.44
Justice Harlan’s 1888 decision concluded that the state owned the lakebed; the city (not the
federal government) owned Lake Park, including its filled lands; and the railroad could keep all
its lakefront improvements.45 The federal government, Harlan determined, had no property rights
in Lake Park, having conveyed to the city all its rights.46 The result rejected the reasoning
underlying the 1869 injunction against the city’s plans to sell the northern portion of Lake Park to
the railroad for a passenger depot,47 although the federal government did retain regulatory rights
over Lake Michigan navigation.48 The authors consider the court’s declaration that the city’s
ownership of Lake Park included lakebed fills to be based on dubious grounds; since the basis of

41

Id. The authors list several prominent lawyers involved, including former Senator Lyman Trumbull,
representing Illinois Central, and Melville Fuller, soon to be appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
for the city. Id. at 55.
42
See id. at 55.
43
See id.
44
Id. (July 5-13, 1887).
45
Id. at 55-57.
46
Id. at 57.
47
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
48
LAKEFRONT, at 57.
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the railroad’s right to improvements was grounded on riparian ownership and language in its state
charter.49
Harlan’s opinion examined in some detail the issue of whether the legislature could revoke
the 1869 grant. He distinguished between the alleged existing shoreland rights the statute
confirmed in the railroad and the lakebed acres of the outer harbor. The former were vested and
constitutionally protected, but not the latter because Harlan concluded that the statute gave the
railroad only discretionary authority to construct the outer harbor, and the railroad had not done so
before the legislative revocation of 1873. 50 He also concluded the railroad’s request that the city
return the money the railroad had paid for building its planned passenger depot in Lake Park was
evidence that the grant was revocable.51
Harlan’s decision ratified the status quo of existing possessory rights, what the authors’
claim was an exercise in “pragmatic accommodation.”52 By recognizing the railroad’s rights to all
its improvements, the decision gave the railroad much of what it wanted, including what the
authors’ claim is de facto control of the outer harbor due to aggressive recent developments. But
two-and-a-half years after Harlan’s decision, the railroad decided to appeal. 53

Id. at 57-58. The city’s lakebed filling was justified on grounds that its charter authorized construction of
a breakwater (even though the railroad constructed it), but it said nothing about filling the lakebed. The
railroad’s riparian rights included the right to wharf out. Id.
50
Id. at 58, quoting Harlan to the effect that the railroad had only a revocable “license,” a conclusion he
reached despite, as the authors point out, language in the 1869 act that conveyed the harbor to the railroad
in “fee.” Id.
51
Id. at 58–59.
52
Id. at 59:
The railroad got to keep all its track, terminals, yards, wharves, and piers. All it lost was future
development rights. The city got to keep all of Lake Park, over which it episodically exercised
control. All it lost was the ability to oust the railroad from the lakefront. The federal government
got to keep its breakwater and to continue to exercise a veto over new facilities in the harbor. The
only party given nothing but abstract rights was the state, which was declared to be the owner of
the submerged land—over which it had never exercised effective control.
53
Id. at 59 (noting that the railroad’s lawyers thought its vested rights argument would be well received by
the Supreme Court).
49
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IV. The Appeal
While the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the 400th anniversary of
Christopher Columbus’ “discovery” was about to be celebrated, and Congress selected Chicago as
the site for the World Columbian Exposition. 54 The siting of the fair at what was to become Jackson
Park, seven miles south of the city, instead of at Lake Park in the city center, involved protracted
negotiations among the parties to the Lakefront Case, particularly how to transport what turned
out to be nearly nine million passengers to and from Jackson Park, the details of which will not be
recounted here.55 One consequence of those negotiations was to ask for and receive Supreme Court
acceptance of an expedited hearing in the pending Lake Front Case, although the Court’s decision
came too late to be consequential in terms of transportation planning for the fair.56
A Court of only seven justices held three days of oral argument in October 1892.57 Justice
Stephen J. Field—the longest-serving justice of the 19th century—wrote the opinion for a divided
4-3 Court.58 He ratified the lower court’s decision on state lakebed ownership, announcing that the
lakebeds of the Great Lakes were similar to tidal submerged lands, which the Court had long
recognized as state-owned.59

54

Id.
The authors explain the negotiations over the world’s fair at some length, which eventually produced
agreements on steamer piers and viaducts to get passengers to and from the fair. See id. at 59–72. The
railroad proceeded to build a new passenger depot, Central Station, south of Lake Park, which was finished
just weeks before the fair opened, enabling the railroad to profit handsomely from the ten-cent tickets it
sold. Id. at 71–72.
56
Id. at 72.
57
Chief Justice Fuller did not participate, since he had been counsel to the city in the case, see supra note
41. Justice Blatchford, who was a stockholder in Illinois Central, also recused. Id. at 73. The participation
of Justice Harlan, who was reviewing his own circuit court decision, “passed without question.” Id. at 74.
58
Justice Field, appointed by President Lincoln in 1863, served until 1897, a record length until broken by
Justice William O. Douglas in 1975.
59
Id. at 74. This result was predictable based on the Court’s reasoning in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324
(1877), in which it recognized state ownership of submerged inland waters. See supra note 10.
55

12
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926868

Field also agreed with Harlan that the railroad’s existing developments (some on filled
land) were vested in light of state and city approvals.60 But he disagreed with Harlan’s
interpretation that the outer harbor grant was a revocable license until developed.61 Instead, Field
decided that the grant was inherently revocable, developed or not, because the state’s title was held
in trust for the public for navigation, fishing, and commerce purposes.62 This was “a title different
in character from which the state holds lands in trust for sale.”63 The idea that title to submerged
Lake Michigan land was held by the state in trust for the public was, the authors note, a position
that had been mentioned in the press in 1869. Perhaps this opposition influenced the governor’s
earlier veto of the Lake Front Act, and the city briefed the claim of public ownership in the Lake
Front case.64 Public ownership of land submerged beneath navigable waters was actually a fairly
well-established proposition by 1892.65
The authors observe that formulating public ownership as a trust was reflective of Field’s
“deep[] suspicion[s] of legislative[ly] conferred special privileges and monopolies.” 66 Field
characterized Illinois Central as a “corporation created for one purpose, the construction and
operation of a railroad between designated points, is, by the [1869] act, converted into a
corporation to manage and practically control the harbor of Chicago . . . for its own profit
generally.”67 This antimonopoly sentiment animates public trust jurisprudence to this day. 68

60

Id. at 74.
See supra note 49.
62
LAKEFRONT, at 76.
63
Id. (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452).
64
Id. The state had made the trust argument before Justice Harlan in the circuit court case, and city made
the argument in its briefs to the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Arnold v. Mundy and Martin v. Waddell, see id.
at 319-20, n. 94). See also supra note 15 and note 19 and accompanying text (earlier trust arguments).
65
See case law cited supra note 10.
66
LAKEFRONT, at 76.
67
Id. (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 451).
68
See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine, 44
B.C. ENVTL AFFAIRS L. REV. 1 (2017).
61

13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926868

The authors do not subscribe to Field’s theory of the railroad as a monopolist, describing
the railroad’s efforts leading up to the 1869 act as defensive, attempting to ward off other
competitors seeking access to the lakefront. 69 But monopolists fear just such competition. That
fear does not make them non-monopolistic.
Lakefront quotes the famous line of the Supreme Court’s opinion that the state of Illinois
could no more abdicate the public trust in property in which “the whole people are interested” like
the Chicago harbor than it could renounce its police power, but they quickly note that Justice Field
could cite no authority for the proposition. 70 They make no attempt to assess the implications on
sovereign authority from the parallel Field saw between the police power and the public trust. A
logical conclusion would be that both the police power and the public trust are both inherent in
sovereignty, the former an affirmative power, the latter a limitation. Several courts have ruled that
the public trust is indeed an inherent limit on sovereignty.71 The authors do not see the public trust
in this light.
Field’s anti-monopolistic concerns led to his holding that the 1869 grant was beyond the
Illinois legislature’s authority, 72 although smaller grants, that do not substantially impair remaining

69

LAKEFRONT, at 77.
Id. Justice Field stated: “The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested, like navigable waters and the soils underneath them, so as to leave them entirely under the
use and control of private parties . . . than it can abolish its police powers . . . .”
71
See, e.g., Mineral County v. Lyon County, 2020 WL 5849506 at *4 (Nev. Sept. 27, 2020) (public trust
“derives from inherent limitations of a state’s sovereign powers”); Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,
83 A.3d 901, 947 (Pa. 2013) (public trust provision in the state constitution created no new rights but
enumerated pre-existing rights of such “general, great and essential quality as to be ensconced as
inviolate”); Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassel, 837 P.2d 158, 168 (Ariz. App. 1991)
(public trust is “an inabrogable attribute of statehood itself”); Esplande Properties v. City of Seattle, 307
F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is beyond cavil that ‘a public trust has always existed in Washington,’”
only “partially encapsulated by the state constitution . . . ”), (citing Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062,
1072 (Wash. 1987); Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993)).
72
LAKEFRONT, at 77: “A grant of all the lands under navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged
to be within the legislative power.” (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453).
70
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trust properties, or which serve trust purposes, are permissible.73 The grant was, consequently, “if
not absolutely void on its face . . . subject to revocation.” 74 The Court also upheld the city’s title
to Lake Park, even as expanded by filling, against claims by the railroad and the state, due to the
city’s riparian right to wharf out. 75
A three-member dissent, in an opinion authored by Justice George Shiras, did not challenge
the majority’s view of the PTD but would have ruled that the 1873 revocation required payment
of just compensation to the railroad. 76 Shiras also questioned the ripeness of the case. He would
also have waited “to invoke the doctrine of the inviolability of public rights when and if the railroad
company shall attempt to disregard them.” 77 But the majority found the grant of the outer harbor
invalid, and the railroad’s motion for reconsideration failed twice.78
V. The Result
Thirty-three years after the Lake Front Act, nineteen years of litigation ended with the
Court essentially grandfathering all of Illinois Central’s developments but preserving public

The authors do not include Field’s language concerning the exceptions to the nonalienation rule, but it is
worth quoting here: “The control of the state for purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. The
book does suggest that that “small, commerce-promoting grants of submerged land, needed for wharves,
docks, and piers, and large monopolistic grants of submerged land, which could be used arbitrarily to restrict
the public’s access for navigation and fishing.” LAKEFRONT, at 77.
74
LAKEFRONT, at 77. The distinction between void on its face and voidable could be significant if the latter
required revocation by the state.
75
Id. at 78.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 79 (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 474 (Shiras, J., dissenting)).
78
Id. at 79. The Court did not address the federal issues in the Lake Front Case because the federal
government did not join in the expedited appeal. But in 1894, the Court rejected the notion that the federal
government retained rights in Lake Park, and therefore lacked standing to enforce any limitations, although
the Court suggested that the Michigan Avenue landowners had standing because they purchased in reliance
on the adjacent public dedication of the parkland. The effect of the latter ruling would spawn considerable
litigation over construction of building in Lake Park, soon to be renamed as Grant Park. See id. at 80. In
1902, the Supreme Court affirmed lower court decisions that that the railroad’s existing piers and wharves
did not extend beyond “practical navigability,” thus upholding Illinois Central’s existing improvements.
Any future developments, however, would require public approval. See id.
73
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control over future development. The authors recognize the Lake Front case as “one of the most
important cases about property rights in American law.”79 That is true for the PTD that the Court
recognized, for it interjected some public balance into an overwhelming privatized system of
property rights.
But the authors’ discussion of the case seems halting and truncated. They use adjectives
like “nebulous” and “blunderbuss” to describe the PTD, and explain in some great detail that the
preservation of the public lakefront in the wake of the Lake Front Case and into the 20 th century,
at least until 1970, was due not to the public trust but to the public dedication doctrine.80 The public
dedication doctrine was enforced by wealthy Michigan Avenue property owners like the mailorder retailer Aaron Montgomery Ward.81 That assessment is no doubt true as to the Chicago
lakefront. But the PTD that the Lake Front Case helped formulate is the most notable reason for
its characterization as an important decision over a century-and-quarter later. Consequently, the
book’s persistent attempt to diminish the doctrine seems incongruous given the title of the book
and may undermine an otherwise exceptionally important contribution to urban legal history.82
VI. The Legacy
The authors’ apparent ideological antipathy for the PTD seems to lie in the uncertainty it
interjects into the overwhelmingly private rights ordering of American property law, which they

79

Id. at 81.
Id. at 83-127.
81
Ward, referred to as the “watchdog of the lakefront,” where his store on Michigan Avenue store was
situated, had an outsized influence keeping the lakefront free of buildings through a long series of lawsuits.
See id. at 95-118.
82
The book’s contribution to the history of Chicago includes chapters on the filling and private development
of “Streeterville,” now home to the campus of Northwestern’s Pritzker School of Law; the reversal of the
Chicago River over the objections of the state of Missouri, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); and the extension of Lake Shore Drive both north and south. LAKEFRONT. at
128-243.
80
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seem to think unwise.83 They explain the resurrection of the PTD three-quarters of a century after
the Lake Front Case, coinciding with the nascent environmental law movement of the early 1970s,
and they point to Professor Sax’s arguments as especially influential. 84 So they were.85 But the
authors complain that the PTD had a haphazard effect on the lakefront, allowing Northwestern
University to expand by filling the lake, while disallowing Loyola University from doing virtually
the same thing a few years later. 86 Similarly, the PTD was not offended by construction of a public
middle school in Washington Park or the renovation of Soldier Field in Burnham Park, but
disallowed the expansion of the U.S. Steelworks by a planned filling of nearly 200 acres of Lake
Michigan.87 And while George Lucas was dissuaded from pursuing his museum on the lakefront,
the Obama Foundation is proceeding with its proposed library. 88 The authors emphasize the
uncertainty and the apparent random nature of these results.89 The inference is that the variability
in outcomes is undesirable because it undermines property rights, a frequent claim of PTD critics.90

Merrill’s casebook on property law is one of the leading treatments of the subject. THOMAS W. MERRILL
& HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3rd ed. 2017).
84
LAKEFRONT, at 263–68 (discussing Sax’s article, supra note 5, and its effect on decisions like Paepcke
v. Public Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970) (allowing a school in Washington Park as
consistent with the PTD), and People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976)
(rejecting a statute approving the grant of 194 acres of lakebed to U.S. Steel to expand its South Works
steel mill as inconsistent with the PTD). The book is quite critical of the latter decision, complaining about
the PTD “theory” as a source of authority, since the court did not tie the PTD to the state’s constitution.
LAKEFRONT, at 268-69.
85
See Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 5.
86
LAKEFRONT, at 274.
87
Id. at 266.
88
Id. at 292.
89
Id.
90
Among the most prominent of these critics is my friend and former dean, Jim Huffman. See, e.g, James
L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2007) (claiming that the PTD’s Roman and English roots are mythical, a claim refuted at
least in part by Ruhl & McGinn’s article, supra note 9); James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public
Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (claiming that the PTD is
inconsistent with a constitutional democracy, although a number of courts have disagreed, see, e.g., John
C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 263 (2015); Kacy
Manahan, The Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine, 49 ENVTL. L. 263 (2019); see also cases cited in supra
note 71).
83
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Yet recognition of the existence of substantial, if uncertain public rights in the midst of an
overwhelmingly private property rights system infused a kind of pluralism into the Chicago
lakefront that created a substantially different lakefront that would have been created by an
exclusively private rights system. The authors overlook the important role played by the PTD in
moderating the private rights system, of requiring a kind of accommodation between public and
private rights.91 Instead, they criticize the application of the PTD for not producing consistent
results. But property doctrine often produces such results. Consider nuisance law, prescriptive
easements, riparian rights, or takings law, none of which produce results that are particularly
predictable.92
The authors also emphasize that, under the Illinois PTD, court interpretations are subject
to override by the state legislature.93 That might be the law of Illinois, but a substantial number of
jurisdictions consider the PTD to be inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not subject to legislative
repeal.94 The Lake Front decision at the center of the book clearly equated the PTD with the
inalienable state police power.95 A logical interpretation of the Supreme Court’s interpretation
would be that, like the police power, the public trust is inherent in sovereignty. The book instead

91

See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation
Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649 (2010).
92
See. e.g., Michael C. Blumm, A Dozen Landmark Nuisance Cases and Their Environmental Significance,
62 ARIZ. L. REV. 403, 444 (explaining the rise of reasonableness criterion at the heart of nuisance doctrine
in the 20th century, giving courts broad authority to decisions about alleged nuisances and to fashion
nuisance remedies base on “balancing the equities); John A. Lovett, Restating the Law of Prescriptive
Easements, 104 MARQ. L. REV. 939 (2021) (examining the split among jurisdictions as to whether an
unexplained use is presumed to be adverse to the owner and advocating for a hybrid approach to the issue);
Joseph W. Dellapenna, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 6.01, 3d ed. (Amy K. Kelley, ed. 2021)
(discussing the uncertainties in the scope of riparian water rights); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S.Ct.
2063 (2021) (expanding considerably the scope of “permanent physical occupations” that are per se takings
of property rights).
93
LAKEFRONT, at 245.
94
See supra note 71.
95
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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endorses legislative override,96 although curiously the authors seem to regret the Illinois
legislature’s override of the public dedication doctrine that the authors believe was central to the
public preservation of the lakefront. 97
Any discussion of the PTD and Professor Sax’s article should have mentioned its
significant influence internationally. 98 The authors do not. The reader is left with the sense that the
doctrine was an idiosyncratic interpretation of an odd decision that actually had very little real
effect on the modern Chicago lakefront. Actually, the Lake Front Case and Professor Sax have had
enormous influence throughout the world.99 But there is no mention of this legacy in Lakefront.
Conclusion
Lakefront is an engrossing read, at least as legal analyses go, and will prove to be an
enduring contribution to urban legal history. But its effort to diminish the effect of the PTD is
misguided. The book not only largely misses the long history of the PTD before the Lakefront
Case that evolved out of Roman and English law,100 it also seems surprised at the doctrine’s recent
success in preserving the Chicago lakefront. 101 The book does therapeutically link the doctrine to

96

LAKEFRONT, at 298. This affinity for legislative control of the PTD conflicts with the notion that the
doctrine is inherent in sovereignty, see cases cited in supra note 71. It also is inconsistent with the Illinois
Central Court’s rejection the vested rights of the railroad, since if the legislature could create vested rights
in Chicago Harbor, it “would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature
of the state in which the harbor is situated.” Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455.
97
See LAKEFRONT, at 283.
98
See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law,
and Constitutional Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C.-DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012)
(discussing the PTD in India, Pakistan, The Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil,
Ecuador, and Canada).
99
See id.
100
See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
101
LAKEFRONT, at 291-98 (discussing litigation over proposed fills by U.S. Steel and Loyola University
and the use of parkland by the proposed Lucas museum).
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Justice Field’s Jacksonian view of antimonopoly views,102 and it points out that the fills that make
up the Chicago lakefront today were persistently upheld by the courts. 103
Yet the book lacks any discussion of the adverse environmental effects of the fills on the
Lake Michigan ecology; the assumption seems to be that the fills were costless. Ignoring these
environmental effects of lake fills makes the book seem anachronistic. Part of the PTD’s aim is to
protect public trust resources against “substantial impairment” of trust resources. 104 Despite the
mention of public trust in its title, Lakefront makes no attempt to explain what “substantial
impairment” of trust resources demanded by the PTD actually is. In discussing the failed proposal
to fill lakebed to expand U.S. Steel’s South Works, the authors discuss the Illinois Supreme Court
decision without giving any consideration to the environmental effects of filling 194 acres of
lakebed.105 Similarly, explaining the effect the so-called “boundary-line” agreements that
effectively ratified numerous illegal lakebed fills, the authors suggest that the “cost was barely a
hundred acres of lakebed, a tiny fraction of the vast lake.” 106 This cavalier dismissal of
environmental externalities is a major oversight. 107

Id. at 76 (noting Field’s antipathy to what he perceived to be “a powerful and privileged corporation”;
see supra text accompanying note 67).
103
Id. at 45, 55-57, 78, 81 (upholding the fills of the railroad prior to the Illinois Central decision). The
only structure that the courts required removed was the NL champion Chicago White Stockings stadium in
Lake Front Park, as inconsistent with the public dedication doctrine. Id. at 92-94
104
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453; see supra note 73.
105
The authors’ instead emphasize the “scant evidence” that the filling would interfere with on navigation,
commerce, and fishing, and the lack of deference the court gave to the Illinois legislature’s approval of the
conveyance in 1963. LAKEFRONT, at 266-67.
106
Id. at 242.
107
Another oversight is the failure to emphasize the parallel between the public trust’s migration from
submerged lands to upland parklands in the 20th century, as reflected in cases like Paepcke v. Public
Building Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970) (LAKEFRONT, at 260-66) or the Lucas Museum project
(id. at 291-98), to the earlier, dramatic expansion in public rights in inland navigable waters in the 19 th
century. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. The Illinois parkland trust cases have been prominent
among cases, including from other jurisdictions, which have divorced the public trust from waterbodies.
See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 2, chap. 8.
The exhumation of the Lake Front Case by Professor Sax has, over the past quarter-century, also
led to a surprisingly international revolution in public trust doctrine in places as diverse as India, Pakistan,
102
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As a case study of the development of Chicago, Lakefront may be unmatched. It should be
featured in Chicago bookstores as history at its best: a great story about the triumph of public rights
in preventing monopolization and producing an unmatched waterfront. But the title of the book is
misleading; it may be about public rights, but the authors’ cramped view of the PTD hardly
deserves the title page. 108 And its halting treatment of the PTD undermines the legal value of
Lakefront, despite its considerable historic value.

Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Philippines. See id. chap. 11. The book makes
no mention of the significance of these developments.
108
Perhaps the opportunity to insert a reference to a doctrine opposed by private property interests was too
irresistible in terms of promoting book sales. At any rate, readers expecting the book to show how the 19th
century Lake Front Case, energized by Professor Sax, has become a powerful force in both domestic and
international law, are likely to be disappointed by the book’s jaundiced view of the public trust.
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